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  The 2014 John Bates Clark Medal of the American Economic Association was awarded to 
Matthew Gentzkow of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.   The citation recognized 
Matt’s “fundamental contributions to our understanding of the economic forces driving the creation of 
media products, the changing nature and role of media in the digital environment, and the effect of 
media on education and civic engagement.”   In addition to his work on the media, Matt has made a 
number of significant contributions to empirical industrial organization more broadly, as well as to 
applied economic theory.   In this essay, I highlight some of these contributions.   
  Matt earned both his AB in 1997, and after a brief career in the theatre, his PhD in 2004 from 
Harvard, where he began to work on the media.   At Harvard he also met Jesse Shapiro, his close friend 
and collaborator.   I was one of Matt’s (as well as Jesse’s) thesis advisors.  From Harvard, both Matt and 
Jesse moved to Chicago Booth School, where their research truly thrived, and they contributed to a 
fantastic group of applied economists.    
 
Background on Economics of the Media  
 
  After journalists played a prominent role in uncovering the Watergate conspiracies of the early 
1970s, US newspapers for a time enjoyed an extraordinary reputation for objectivity.   Just as intended 
by the US Constitution, the narrative ran, the Fourth Estate found and reported the unvarnished truth 
about dishonest and corrupt politicians, and brought it to the attention of voters.   Newspapers, of 
course, used editorial pages to express opinions, but the news sections stuck to the facts.  This 
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 reputation of the media was bolstered by the protections for freedom of the press in the US 
Constitution, various pieces of regulation, as well as Supreme Court rulings that made it close-to-
impossible to win a lawsuit for libel against a newspaper (because such a lawsuit had to prove malice 
and reckless disregard for the truth rather than just falsehood and negligence).   Thus, while economists 
developed rather cynical views of politics (with public choice theory) and of regulation (with regulatory 
capture theory), they bought into a “normative” model of the press.   Even as economists accumulated 
theories and evidence on self-serving behavior of politicians and regulators, they left the study of the 
press – the profit-seeking, competitive press – largely to First Amendment scholars.    
  Over the following decades, this image of the media began to change.   One important 
development was the publication in the early 2000s of a series of fire-breathing exposes by right-wing 
(Coulter 2003; Goldberg 2003) and left-wing (Alterman 2003) journalists accusing the media as a whole 
of extreme reporting slant.   The right saw a left-wing slant; the left detected an equally pernicious right-
wing slant.  These books, as well as the growing prominence of television stations often accused of a 
high degree of political partisanship—like CNN and Fox News—led some economists to become 
interested in the objectivity of the media.    Several obvious questions stood out.  
  First, is media news reporting actually slanted?  Is it the case that, editorial pages aside, media 
outlets report unbiased news or alternatively, through commission or omission, do they deliberately 
bias their reporting?  
  Second, if reporting is biased, what is the reason?  Is such bias driven by the supply-side, as 
when reporting reflects the prejudices of an outlet’s owners or journalists?   Indeed, the journalistic 
accounts of the media bias in the early 2000s took it for granted that the biases of owners and reporters 
drove the slant.  Alternatively, is the slant driven by demand, as when news outlets cater to the 
preferences of their audience to maintain or increase their readership or viewership?  
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    Third, what is the effect of media competition on accuracy and bias?  Does competition increase 
the accuracy of reporting by individual outlets, so even a consumer of only one source gets better 
information?   Alternatively, does competition make it easier for the “whole truth” to come out from the 
perspective of a hypothetical reader who samples many media sources, even when individual outlets 
are biased?   In this regard, does a typical media consumer rely on one source of news, or seeks truth by 
sampling a variety of sources? 
  Finally, does media reporting actually matter for individual understanding and action?  Does it 
affect knowledge?  Does it influence participation in the political process?  Does it influence how people 
vote?   Do television and newspapers have the same effects, or different ones?  
  In a very short decade, economic research has obtained fairly clear answers to at least some of 
these questions.   To a large extent, this is the consequence of Gentzkow’s work, both on his own and 
with Jesse Shapiro.    In the process, economists have arrived at a much deeper and more thorough 




  A pair of theoretical papers published in the mid-2000s clarified the role of competition in 
shaping media bias when newspapers cater to the demand of their readers.  Mullainathan and Shleifer 
(2005) consider the case of two profit-maximizing newspapers deciding where to locate on a segment of 
readers differentiated by their ideological preferences.  In their model, by assumption readers 
consciously trade off accuracy of a news source against a preference for information that confirms their 
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 beliefs.  As a consequence, readers are willing to pay more for a newspaper whose slant reflects their 
own bias.  In equilibrium, competition leads newspapers to cater to biased readers through slant.    
The underlying logic can be understood in terms of the famous Hotelling (1929) model, which 
begins with an example of two producers facing a set of consumers evenly distributed along a segment, 
which Hotelling analogizes both to a geographic segment, like Main Street in a town, and an ideological 
segment like the political spectrum.  Hotelling argues that if the two consumers will give their business 
to whoever is nearest to them, then the two producers will have an incentive to cluster in the middle of 
the segment. If one producer moved either left or right, that producer would lose customers as the 
other producer would move in that same direction, while just remaining on the longer side of the 
segment. In contrast, if the producers can charge more if they move closer to their customers, then 
instead of clustering, the producers will choose separate locations.  Mullainathan and Shleifer show that 
in a competitive equilibrium with two newspapers, both will report biased news to readers who are 
willing to pay for slant, but with opposite ideological slants.  In fact, adding additional newspapers would 
lead to segregation of readers across sources closest to their biases, and might lead to reduced accuracy 
of individual outlets.  At the same time, a reader exposed to all sources will obtain more accurate 
information through averaging out the slants.       
  Unlike Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), who simply assume a taste for confirming news even if 
coverage is inaccurate, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) make the more subtle, and perhaps more 
plausible, assumption that readers rationally prefer sources consistent with their priors because they 
sincerely believe that those sources are more accurate.   They report (p. 286) the results of a survey in 
which “nearly 30 percent of the respondents who described themselves as conservative indicated that 
they thought they could believe all or most of what the Fox Cable News Network says.  In contrast, less 
than 15 percent of self-described liberals said that they could believe all or most of what the network 
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 reports.”  Gentzkow and Shapiro then build a model in which newspapers slant the news toward the 
priors of their readers to establish a reputation for quality.   As in Mullainathan and Shleifer, this model 
generates slanted reporting in equilibrium.  However, the model predicts that competition reduces such 
bias, because inaccurate reporting would damage newspaper reputation in the long run.   
  These theoretical models helped clarify some of the basic issues on newspaper competition.   
Still, they would have been buried in the dustbin of theory had Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) not written 
a wonderful empirical paper examining the sources of media bias.    The challenge was to measure the 
political orientation of different newspaper outlets, which in modern days all see themselves as 
independent.   At the casual level, Gentzkow and Shapiro recognized that the words newspapers use 
reflect their bias.  For instance, on May 18, 2004, the liberal Washington Post headline read “Same-sex 
couples line up early for a marriage made in Massachusetts.”   On the same day, the conservative 
Washington Times headline read “Homosexuals ‘marry’ in Massachusetts.”  As a more recent example, 
consider the November 30, 2013, headlines as the US government rushed to repair the HealthCare.gov 
website.   According to Washington Post, “Administration Confident on deadline for HealthCare.gov.”  
According to USA Today, “Deadline’s here: Is Healthcare.gov fixed? Sort of.”  According to the Wall 
Street Journal,  “Health Site Likely to Miss Deadline.”   But how can one turn these kinds of anecdotes 
into data? 
Building on the work of Groseclose and Mylio (2005), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)  found a 
solution.   They developed a measure of media slant based on the proximity of an outlet’s language to 
that of Republicans and Democrats in Congress, based on a dataset of all the phrases in the 
Congressional Record in 2005, categorized by the party of the speaker of the phrase.  In 2005, for 
example Democrats in Congress disproportionately referred to “war in Iraq,” while Republicans referred 
to “war on terror.”  Gentzkow and Shapiro then collected data on the use of these highly diagnostic 
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 phrases in US daily newspapers, and used these data to place news outlets on the ideological spectrum 
comparable to members of Congress.   
  In addition to a large methodological advance in how to measure partisan newspaper slant, the 
paper used detailed information on newspaper circulation and voting patterns across space to estimate 
a model of the demand for slant, and to show that – consistent with the theory – consumers gravitate to 
like-minded sources, giving the newspapers an incentive to tailor their content to their readers.  They 
also show that that newspapers respond to that incentive, and that variation in reader ideology explains 
a large portion of the variation in slant across US daily newspapers.   
  As important, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)  show that, after controlling for a newspaper’s 
audience, the identity of its owner does not affect its slant.
1  Two newspapers with the same owner look 
no more similar in their slant than newspapers with different owners.  Ownership regulation in the US 
and elsewhere is based on the premise a news outlet’s owner determines how it spins the news.  
Gentzkow and Shapiro produced the first large-scale test of this hypothesis, which showed that, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom and regulatory stance, demand is much more influential in shaping 
content than supply as proxied by ownership.      
  Any study of contemporary US newspaper markets is necessarily restricted mainly to looking at 
markets with a single major newspaper.  To look at the effects of competition between newspapers on 
ideology, an alternative strategy, pursued by Gentzkow and Shapiro with Michael Sinkinson (2014), is to 
turn to the past.  At the turn of the 20
th century, many US cities had multiple competing newspapers, 
and newspapers commonly expressed explicit partisan affiliations.   Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 
1 Of course, the Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) paper is focused on private newspapers in the United States today.   
In other countries, newspapers and television stations are often either owned (Djankov et al. 2003) or subverted 
(Besley and Prat 2006) by the government, so politicization of the press is a much greater issue. In the United 
States historically, newspapers were affiliated with political parties, and towed the party line (Gentzkow, Glaeser, 
and Goldin 2006).   
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                                                           assembled the US Newspaper Panel, a complete census of English-language daily newspapers in all 
presidential election years from 1872-2004.  They also collected geographically disaggregated data on 
newspaper circulation in 1924, as well as income statements from a small sample of newspapers.  Using 
these data, they estimate a quantitative model of newspaper competition in which news outlets 
compete for both readers and for advertisers. 
  An important aspect of the Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2014) estimation strategy is to 
deal with complementarity and substitution between different outlets.  They rely on and extend an 
earlier paper of Gentzkow’s (2007), which looked at competition between print and online newspapers, 
and in particular examined the question of whether print and online versions of the same newspaper 
are complements or substitutes.   Gentzkow found that print and online newspapers are substitutes, 
and measured the magnitude of crowding out from the introduction of online versions.    In the process, 
he developed a tractable framework for discrete-choice demand in which consumers buy bundles of 
products rather than single items.    
  Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2014) find that competition is a key driver of ideological 
diversity: newspapers differentiate ideologically as a strategy to soften competition for advertisers and 
for readers, in line with theoretical models.   They also find that the market undersupplies diversity, in 
the sense that a policymaker concerned with consumer and producer welfare would want more markets 
in which readers can choose to read both a local Republican paper and a local Democratic paper.  
Interestingly, they consider two kinds of subsidies for newspapers:  subsidies for newspaper distribution 
of the sort first created by the Postal Act of 1792, which continued to be important to newspapers at 
least up through the 1920s, and the indirect subsidies provide by the Newspaper Preservation Act, 
which allow newspapers in a city to sign a joint operating agreement that often combines the business 
operations of the two papers, while keeping the news operations separate.  They find that such 
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 subsidies can improve the functioning of the market for news, delivering more value to the participants 
in the market as well as more diversity in the marketplace of ideas.  
  These empirical studies of newspaper competition answer quite conclusively the first two 
questions: news reporting is indeed slanted, and the principal reason for slant is catering to reader 
demand.  Unbiased news reporting is a myth, not reality, of US media.    
The third question—do readers end up exposed only to biased news?—is harder to answer, 
since it requires knowing the extent to which readers are exposed to one or multiple sources of news.   
To address this question, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) move away from newspapers and study the 
effect of the Internet on the ideological diversity of the American news diet.  One might worry that the 
increase in choice among news suppliers as a result of the Internet would allow news consumers to self-
segregate, reading only news that confirms their preconceptions.  Gentzkow and Shapiro test this claim 
using data from a panel of Internet users for which they have a survey-based measure of political 
ideology and tracking data on online news consumption.  They find that ideological segregation is 
surprisingly low online.  The average conservative’s news outlet is about as conservative as 
usatoday.com; the average liberal’s is as liberal as cnn.com.  The degree of ideological segmentation on 
the Internet is comparable to some traditional news media.  Strikingly, the Internet is less ideologically 
segregated than US residential geography: two people using the same news website are less likely to 
have an ideology in common than two people living in the same zip code.    
 
Effects of the Media 
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   Measuring media bias and understanding the interplay between industry competition and 
ideology in the media industry are important accomplishments.  Of course, we also want to know 
whether the media, biased or otherwise, has any effect on politics.  For example, does reading a 
newspaper or watching television make people more likely to vote?    In addition, does the bias of the 
news sources actually affect how viewers vote? For obvious reasons, these questions are difficult to 
answer.   Readers of newspapers might vote because they are stimulated by newspapers to participate.  
Or prospective voters might read newspapers because they seek information.   Or some factor such as 
an interest in politics, either general or partisan, could drive both newspaper reading and voting.  For 
example, Fox News might persuade people to vote Republican or, alternatively, Republican voters might 
choose to watch Fox News.   
  One solution to these identification problems is to focus on (preferably exogenously 
determined) entry – or exit -- by news organizations into local markets, and to examine its consequences 
on the amount and type of voting.   Gentzkow has also been a pioneer in this line of research.  In 
Gentzkow (2006),  he uses variation across markets in the timing of the introduction to television in the 
United States to identify its impact on voter turnout.   He estimates a huge negative effect: the 
availability of television accounts for between one-quarter and one-half of the total decline in voter 
turnout since the 1950s.  Matt argues that a principal reason for this is substitution in media 
consumption away from newspapers, which provide more political coverage, and thus stimulate more 
interest in voting.   In line with this conjecture, he shows that the entry of television in a market 
coincided with sharp drops in consumption of newspapers and radio, as well as a decline in political 
knowledge as measured by election surveys.  He also shows that both the information and turnout 
effects were largest in off-year congressional elections, which receive extensive coverage in newspapers 
but little or no coverage on television.   
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   Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011) use their US Newspaper Panel to consider the effects 
of newspapers on voting.   Specifically, they focus on entries and exits of US daily newspapers between 
1869 and 2004 to estimate effects on voter turnout and voter partisanship.   They find that newspapers 
have a large effect in raising voter turnout, especially in the period before the introduction of broadcast 
media.  However, the political affiliation of entering newspapers does not affect the partisan 
composition of an area’s vote.   The latter result contrasts with another important finding, by DellaVigna 
and Kaplan (2007), which shows that entry of Fox News does sway some voters toward voting 
Republican.   An interpretation consistent with these findings is that newspapers motivate but not 
persuade, while television does the opposite.   
  Another follow-up study partially redeems television, except in a non-political sphere.  
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) use heterogeneity in the timing of television’s introduction to different 
local markets to identify the effect of preschool television exposure on standardized test scores during 
adolescence.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, watching TV makes you smarter:  an additional year of 
preschool television exposure raises average adolescent test scores by about .02 standard deviations.   
Based on my own teenage experience, I am particularly sympathetic to their finding that these positive 
effects of television on test scores are largest for youngsters from households where English is not the 
primary language (or otherwise disadvantaged).  
 
Economics of Brands and Branding      
 
  Consumer brands raise fascinating issues for economics.  Why are consumers attached to some 
brands, that that consumers buy them repeatedly?   Why do they pay a premium for brands?  Do brands 
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 represent superior products, or are they just trusted by consumers who could buy equally good 
unbranded items? 
  Bronnenberg, Dube, and Gentzkow (2012) present some remarkable facts about brand loyalty 
by looking at consumers who move from one city to another.   They show that movers continue to buy 
the brands they bought in their places of previous residence, even if their new city is dominated by 
another brand.  The paper shows that brand preferences form endogenously based on where 
consumption started, are highly persistent, and explain 40 percent of geographic variation in market 
shares.  Put differently, there are Coke cities and Pepsi cities, and people growing up in a Coke city 
would continue to drink Coke, even if they move to a Pepsi city.   Brand preferences are almost 
addictive.  
  Bronnenberg, Dube, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2014) address a different question about brands:  
do brands reflect superior objective quality?    They ask whether specialists, such as doctors or chefs, 
buy branded products or generic ones.  They find that although even experts often buy branded 
products, experts are much more likely than non-experts to buy generics and avoid brands.  They 
interpret this finding to suggest that branding is a mechanism of conveying quality information to 
uninformed buyers, for which these buyers willingly pay, but which experts know already and do not 
need to pay for.      
 
Economics of Persuasion 
 
  Persuasion has been central to economics beginning at least with Stigler’s (1961) work on 
advertising, which interpreted advertising as provision of information to potential buyers.   Two decades 
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 later, Grossman and Hart (1980), Milgrom (1981), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), proved a paradoxical 
result about persuasion.   If the persuader has information that the audience does not have, and the 
persuader cannot lie, then the persuader will have to disclose all of the information he has truthfully, for 
failure to disclose any individual item would be interpreted as hiding the worst facts.   Ugly truth is 
better than selective omission, since the latter means the truth is even uglier.  The finding appears to 
suggest that, with rational parties, persuasion in the sense of selective disclosure of information does 
not work: the best one can do is tell the whole truth
2.  
  Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) take a fresh look at this problem, reframe it, and obtain some 
quite unexpected results.  Rather than focusing on the persuader with superior information, they ask a 
different question: supposing the persuader and the audience begin with the same information, can the 
persuader design a test, which the audience will see the results of, that would actually further the goals 
of the persuader? In concrete terms, can a prosecutor look for evidence, with the judge knowing exactly 
what type of evidence he is looking for, how he is looking for it, and what he finds, that will make the 
judge more likely to convict?    Can an advertiser design a “taste test,” with the potential customers 
knowing exactly what the advertiser is doing, that would increase demand?   
  At first glance the answer might seem to be “no.”  Indeed, there is a precise sense in which 
persuasion is difficult in such settings: a Bayesian audience cannot expect to be surprised, so its 
expected posterior is always equal to the prior.   Thus, a persuader interested in changing the audience’s 
average posterior is out of luck.  
  What Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show is that the “no-surprise-on-average” property of the 
Bayes’ Rule summarizes all the content of rationality.  With the right choice of tests, the persuader can 
2 A Spring (2008) JEP symposium on persuasion features Milgrom’s summary of his work in this area, Gentzkow 
and Shapiro’s overview of the research on accuracy in media, and Pete Leeson’s cross-country study of the 
relationship between media freedom, political knowledge, and participation.   
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                                                           in principle achieve any distribution of posterior beliefs on the part of the audience subject to the “no-
surprise-on-average” constraint.  This insight yields a beautiful geometric representation of the 
persuader’s problem.  It allows Kamenica and Gentzkow to show that if the persuader has a payoff that 
is nonlinear in the audience’s belief, then persuasion is possible in the sense that the persuader can 
design a test that furthers the goals of the persuader.  It also allows for a precise characterization of the 
optimal testing regime for a variety of interesting problems.   
  To take a specific example, suppose the murderer’s blood is left at the crime scene.  We know 
the defendant has blood type A.  Suppose that the judge’s and the prosecutor’s prior belief that the 
defendant is guilty of murder is .3; their information is completely symmetric.   Suppose the judge 
convicts if the posterior probability of guilt is above .5, so absent an investigation the judge would 
always acquit. If, instead, the prosecutor publicly conducts a fully informative investigation that 
perfectly reveals guilt, he can increase the prior odds of conviction from 0 to 30%: because the judge’s 
action is non-linear in beliefs, the prosecutor can benefit from providing full information on average 
despite the “no-surprise-on-average” constraint.    
Perhaps more surprisingly, Kamenica and Gentzkow show that the prosecutor can do even 
better by performing a less informative investigation.  To illustrate, the prosecutor proposes to the 
judge to test the type of blood at the crime scene.  If the defendant is indeed guilty, the crime-scene 
blood is always type A: Pr(A\guilty) = 1.  If the defendant is innocent, the crime-scene blood is of type A 
42 percent of the time, given blood type frequencies in the US population: Pr(A\innocent) = .42.   With 
this test, the posterior probability of guilt is just above .5 whenever the test indicates type A blood, so 
the judge convicts whenever the test comes back type A.   More precisely, by Bayes’ Rule, Pr(Guilty\A) = 
[Pr(A\Guilty) *Pr(Guilty)]/ [Pr(A\Guilty)*Pr(Guilty) + Pr(A\Innocent)*Pr(Innocent)] = [1*.3]/[1*.3 + 
.42*.7]  > .5.   With a prior of .3 of guilt, this test, if conducted and reported truthfully, yields a prior 
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 probability of conviction of .3*1 +.7*.42 = .594.  With symmetric beliefs, and the judge and the 
prosecutor both knowing exactly what is going on, the prosecutor can raise the odds of conviction all the 
way to 60 percent, despite the parties knowing that only 30 percent of the defendants are guilty.  In this 
very precise way, persuasion is effective. 
  In follow-up work, Gentzkow and Kamenica (GK, 2012) extend this analysis to the case of 
multiple persuaders, who choose what information to gather and communicate to a receiver who can 
take actions that affect their welfare.   GK show that competition among persuaders necessarily 
increases the amount of information being revealed.   This result connects with the earlier finding of 




  Ten years ago, we knew almost nothing about how newspapers actually report news.  There 
were questions, but no answers – just media hype.  Today, we actually have answers to many of the 
questions that were raised initially.   We know that media reporting is systematically slanted, that slant 
is largely driven by demand, and that competition allows more of the viewpoints to get out.  We also 
know that media influence their audiences, for sure in getting them to participate in politics, and 
sometimes in how they vote as well.   At the same time, we have many new questions about the media:  
How exactly do they persuade?  How do readers decide how many sources to attend to?    How will the 
rise of new digital platforms and revenue models affect media content and political discourse?  That 
media economics is now a full-fledged field is significantly a consequence of the contributions made by 
Matthew Gentzkow.  
15 
   After rereading Matt’s papers, and reading some for the first time, I am struck by his openness 
to different ways of doing economics.   He has an uncanny ability to rely on different approaches, 
depending on what the problem he is considering calls for.  Sometimes he uses quasi-experimental 
evidence to identify the effects he is interested in; other times he estimates full structural models.    
Some papers deal with small data sets; others rely on frontier big data techniques.  Several of the papers 
contain practical econometric advances that have become useful to subsequent researchers.   
Sometimes Matt uses the simplest models that only summarize the verbal ideas; other papers, such as 
the work on persuasion, contain significant contributions to economic theory.  Much of his work is 
extremely neoclassical, but some is behavioral as well.   Some papers deal with abstract conceptual 
issues; others are solidly grounded in practical concerns, including regulatory ones.      
  This range is admirable not just for its own sake.  My sense is that when areas of economics 
conclude that there is only one correct way of analyzing a problem, they stagnate.  Our discipline is not 
far enough along to settle down in this way.   Openness to new ways of doing things is essential for 
making progress.  I would go further and conjecture that such openness is the hallmark of 21
st century 
economics.   The fact that Matthew Gentzkow, along with his remarkable collaborators and several 
other recent winners of the John Bates Clark Medal, embraces such openness is both a testimony to 
their talents, and very good news for our field.     





I am grateful to Emir Kamenica, Jesse Shapiro, and Josh Schwartzstein for extremely helpful comments. 
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